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The Merits of Global Constitutionalism
ANNE PETERS*
ABSTRACT
Global constitutionalism is an agenda that identifies and advocatesfor the application
of constitutionalist principles in the international legal sphere. Global constitutionaliza-
tion is the gradual emergence of constitutionalist features in international law. Critics of
global constitutionalism doubt the empirical reality ofconstitutionalization, call into ques-
tion the analytic value of constitutionalism as an academic approach, and fear that the
discourse is normatively dangerous because it is anti-pluralist, artificially creates a false
legitimacy, and promises an unrealistic end of politics. This article addresses these objec-
tions. I argue that global constitutionalization is likely to compensate for globalization-
induced constitutionalist deficits on the national level, that a constitutionalist reading of
international aw can serve as a hermeneutic device, and that the constitutionalist vocabu-
lary uncovers legitimacy deficits of international law and suggests remedies. Global con-
stitutionalism, therefore, has a responsibilizing and much-needed critical potential.
INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Global constitutionalism is an academic and political agenda that identifies and
advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the international legal
sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the fairness of the international
legal order.' Global constitutionalization refers to the continuing, but not linear,
process of the gradual emergence and deliberate creation of constitutionalist ele-
* Prof. Dr. iur., University of Basel.
1. See Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, Introduction-Global Constitutionalism from an Inter-
disciplinary Perspective, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385 (2009) (discussing the terms "constitu-
tion," "constitutionalism," and "constitutionalization").
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ments in the international legal order by political and judicial actors, bolstered by an
academic discourse in which these elements are identified and further developed.
The global constitutionalist discourse has challenged the traditional view that
the international sphere is "a sort of constitutional wasteland or empty quarter. 2
The articles in this issue deal with various aspects of global constitutionalism, such
as constitutional procedures for resolving value conflicts, and balancing as a consti-
tutional technique. They examine the constitutional functions of the law of interna-
tional responsibility as well as sectoral constitutions in special fields of international
law. They also discuss the chances for and exigencies of democratic global constitu-
tion; the way global constitutionalism impacts individuals nested in nation-states;
and the empirical standards that may be used to gauge global constitutionalism.
There are four important elements of constitutionalization that are not ana-
lyzed in depth in the following articles and which I therefore wish to discuss here.3
First, the principle of sovereignty is being ousted from its position as a Letztbe-
griindung (first principle) of international law. The normative status of sover-
eignty is derived from humanity, that is, the legal principle that human rights,
interests, needs, and security must be respected and promoted. This normative
status is also the telos of the international legal system.4 Humanity is foundational
in a normative sense because states are not ends in themselves, but are composite
entities whose justification lies in the fulfilment of public functions needed for
human beings to live together in peace and security.5 State sovereignty is founda-
tional for international law only in an ontological sense, because the states' mutual
respect for each other's sovereignty constitutes the "horizontal" system of juxta-
posed actors, and governs international lawmaking activity. A humanized state
sovereignty implies responsibility for the protection of basic human rights and the
government's accountability to humans. When human needs are taken as the
starting point, the focus shifts from states' rights to states' obligations vis-A-vis
natural persons, and a state that does not discharge these duties has its sovereignty
suspended. The possibility of a suspension of state sovereignty leads, in a system of
multilevel governance under the principle of solidarity, to a fallback responsibility
2. Philip Allott, Intergovernmental Societies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE LEGITIMACY
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 69, 92 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
3. See generally Anne Peters, Conclusions, in JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2009).
4. See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and n2 of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming
2009).
5. This justification is accepted by theories of the state of all shades, and even Hegel can be read
in that way.
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of the international community, acting through the U.N. Security Council. The
ongoing process of humanizing sovereignty is the cornerstone of the current
transformation of international law into a system centered on individuals.
Second, the principle of state consent is partly replaced by majoritarian deci-
sion-making. This is apt to improve the effectiveness of global governance, and
thus contributes to output legitimacy of the system. However, the equality, inclu-
sion, and representation of states in international organizations are in tension with
the idea of equal representation of world citizens because states contain popula-
tions of vastly different sizes. Equality of more populated states results in the in-
equality and skewed representation of global citizens. Accepting the premise that
the ultimate reference points of democracy are natural persons, state majoritari-
anism is, in a democratic perspective, ambiguous.6
Third, certain basic values, such as human rights protection, climate protec-
tion, and maybe even free trade, seem to have acquired universal acceptance, as
manifested in the universal ratification of relevant multilateral treaties. An im-
portant caveat is that this interstate consensus is vague and general, whereas the
real problems lie in the details. Another concern is that widespread ratification
does not necessarily reflect genuine commitments, but is often the result of power
imbalances and strategic maneuvers. The formal acceptance of universal treaties
enshrining constitutional values is not the end, but rather the beginning, of the
constitutionalization of international law.
Fourth, the settlement of international disputes is increasingly legalized and
juridified through the establishment of international courts and tribunals with
quasi-compulsory jurisdiction. This juridification is in some regards merely a
manifestation of the legalization of international relations. However, judicial re-
view also has specific constitutionalist aspects which need further clarification.
A host of objections against global constitutionalism have been raised.7 They
relate both to the legal soundness of the reconstruction and to its arguably negative
policy effects. The critique is thus both an epistemic and analytical, and political
and normative. I submit that, despite the somewhat serious problems associated
6. An interpersonal view of democracy must take into account the democratic formation of col-
lective preferences among the citizens of the nation-states. We then face a paradox. In the inter-state
perspective, it seems illegitimate and undemocratic that in a consensual system a minority (even one
state) can block a treaty. On the other hand, such a veto power seems necessary to preserve interper-
sonal democratic decision-making on the "lower" level, within the smaller community.
7. For a discussion of some of the objections, see Anne Peters, Reconstruction Constitutionnal-
iste du Droit International: Arguments Pour el Contre, in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (Hl ne Ruiz Fabri et al. eds., 2006).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 16:2
with global constitutionalism, the epistemic and normative benefits prevail. The con-
stitutionalist paradigm does some analytic work and generates additional insights!
I. A PAPER TIGER?
The constitutionalist reading of international law might raise dangerously high
expectations.9 The term "constitution" might be a misnomer when applied to the
international sphere. Therefore, says the critique, the very terms on which the con-
stitutionalization debate takes place are erroneous. The vocabulary makes it virtu-
ally impossible to escape from the assumptions that accompany it. And "social
legitimacy is being artificially constructed through the use of constitutional
language."'" Thus, the constitutionalist reconstruction might fraudulently create the
illusion of legitimacy of global governance. Constitutionalist language-in the eyes
of the critique-abuses the highly value-laden term "constitutionalism" in order to
reap profit from its positive connotations and to dignify the international legal order.
However, the danger that constitutionalism might be misunderstood "as a mecha-
nism that can instantly bestow legitimacy"" is, in my view, not or no longer serious.
International and constitutional lawyers are discerning enough to realize that "con-
stitutionalism" is not a ready-made answer, but, on the contrary, a perspective which
might bring into focus the right questions of fairness, justice, and effectiveness.
A related objection is that international law lacks the symbolic-aesthetical di-
mension inherent in national constitutional law. According to this perspective, the
primary function of constitutions is storing the meaning of a political community.
They embody revolutionary ideas, not in an abstract fashion, but by (physical)
sacrifice. Consequently, a constitution is genuinely "owned" by a people mainly
because its meaning is transported by the sacrifice made for it. 2 But, because all
this is lacking on the international plane, the idea of international constitutional
law is, so the argument goes, a sham. However, this criticism places a premium on
bloody wars and risks overstating the importance of irrational and mythological
8. See also Peters, supra note 3.
9. See Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston, Introduction to TOWARDS WORLD
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, at xiii, xvii
(Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005).
10. DEBORAH Z. CASS, CONSTITUTIONALZATION OF THE WTO 208,237 (2005).
11. Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, I INT'L ORG. L. REV. 31, 48 (2004).
12. See Ulrich Haltern, Internationales Verfassungsrecht?, 128 ARCHLY DES 6FFENTLICHEN RECHTS
511, 533-34 (2003). See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991).
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foundations of constitutional law. The realist theory of international relations
raises another important objection. The constitutionalist paradigm became popu-
lar after the final demise of the socialist bloc, in a period marked by an excess of
optimism. 3 Realists point out that international law must content itself with a
more or less "symbolic constitutionalization,"'4 or that any international constitu-
tion is in any case a "nominalist" one in the sense proposed by Karl Loewenstein. 5
The gist of this critique is that the constitutionalist reading of international law is
not grounded in or backed by a real common political will and corresponding
power structures and sanctions at the international level, which would allow the
international constitution to be enforced. The constitutionalist reading, so the ar-
gument goes, is too idealist and does not adequately reflect the realist view of
governments. In the event of a problem or conflict, the critique suggests, any con-
stitutionalist attitude will be given up.6 For instance, governments do not advo-
cate universal protection of human rights because they believe it is a good thing,
but rather because they are exposed to internal pressures by their constituencies to
observe human rights standards and simply want to prevent other states from
gaining a competitive advantage by refusing to be restricted by human rights con-
cerns. Likewise, the U.N. and other international organizations are, for most
member states, only a means of realizing their national interests. 7
Moreover, the agents of constitutionalization seem to be primarily scholars, not
political actors. Empirical findings do not confirm an all-encompassing global trend
of constitutionalization. Rather, empirical evidence points to uneven processes of
constitutionalization in various constitutional dimensions and different world re-
gions.'8 All this suggests that global constitutionalism may be a paper tiger.
This observation is very pertinent. Theoretically, academic reconstructions
do not depend on the moral attitudes of governments, and a good idea does not
become bad simply because politicians do not accept it. However, law, legal con-
structs, and arguments are supposed to have an impact on the exercise of power.
The specific practical function of law to organize society and to structure gover-
13. Sandra Szurek, La Charte des Nations Unies Constitution Mondiale?, in I LA CHARTE DES NA-
TIONS UNIES: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 29,32 (Jean-Pierre Cot et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005).
14. See MARCO NEVES, SYMBOLISCHE KONSTITUTIONALISIERUNG (1998).
15. See KARL LOEWENSTEIN, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE (1957).
16. See Walter Kaiin, Der Menschenrechtsschutz der UNO: Ein Beispielfir die Konstitutionalisie-
rung des Volkerrechts?, 2005 RECHT SONDERHEFT 42, 47, 49.
17. Id. at 49.
18. See generally Klaus Armingeon & Karolina Milewicz, Compensatory Constitutionalisation: A
Comparative Perspective, 22 GLOBAL SOC'Y 179 (2008) (footnote omitted).
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nance mandates that lawyerly (re-)constructions be palatable to relevant political
actors. Thus, global constitutionalism as an academic agenda should follow the
middle path between merely dignifying the status quo and hanging onto aca-
demic pipe dreams. In order to gain acceptance in the political realm, global con-
stitutionalists might highlight the current situation of global interdependence.
With such a state of affairs, national and global public interests tend to converge
more and, increasingly, national interests and universal idealism are not necessar-
ily in opposition. Therefore, global constitutionalism, at least in the long run, may
even further national economic and political interests, although some states may
benefit more than others. Moreover, microconstitutionalization seems to actually
be effective. In comparison to many national constitutional systems throughout
history, the treaty regimes of the European Union (EU), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) can prob-
ably be ranked in the top group of constitutional regimes.
A related strand of criticism insinuates that an important function of global
constitutionalism is to symbolize a simplified, compact order in a world that, in
reality, is complex and amorphous. From this perspective, the myth of the unity of
the constitution must be rejected. According to this criticism, a spontaneous self-
coordination of interests must instead be chosen as a starting point of analysis, le-
gally anchored in individual liberties (human rights) and the cognitive "social
capital" anchored within society. "The constitutional concept then remains an
(imaginary) reference point for a nation-state-like past ....," says the critique. 9
However, the term "constitution" has never been exclusively reserved for state
constitutions. Today, the conceptual link between constitution and state has been
further loosened in everyday language and in the legal discourse, perhaps thereby
broadening the meaning of "constitution." It is therefore not per definitionem im-
possible to conceptualize constitutional law beyond the nation or the state. Global
constitutionalism advocates non-state constitutional law, and tends to demystify
the state and the state constitution.
II. UNPACKING GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Another concern is that the concept of international constitutionalism suffers
from oversell and vagueness. International law, politics, and economics are being
mixed, if not confused. Indeed, there is the danger that reliance on constitutional-
19. Thomas Vesting, Constitutionalism or Legal Theory: Comments on Gunther Teubner, in
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTIrUTIONALisM 29,35 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004).
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ism is actually counterproductive because it may postpone, rather than encourage,
concrete debates on concrete problems, such as decision-making in the WTO, the
composition of the U.N. Security Council, or how to liaise national parliaments to
the U.N. In this issue, Daniel Bodansky pointedly asks whether it would not be bet-
ter to consider both the descriptive and the normative claims associated with consti-
tutionalism on their own merits." For instance, judicial review and a diminished
role for state consent could be descriptively analyzed and normatively propagated
without introducing the concept of constitutionalism. Because the meaning of con-
stitutionalism is so unclear, it may be a confusing, rather than a helpful, shorthand.
Indeed, it would be detrimental to use the constitutionalist vocabulary to de-
scribe the current international system in an inflationary manner. If all (interna-
tional) law is somehow constitutionalized, then nothing is constitutional. The
explicative power of the concept would be reduced to zero.
However, the value of the constitutionalist paradigm might lie in its compre-
hensive nature. The normative claim is that the different features of constitution-
alism are not merely additive, but that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
Bodansky remains skeptical about this holistic claim. He prefers to "unpack" the
concept of constitutionalism into its component elements and then consider the
proper role of each in international governance.2' In contrast, I suggest that the
various constitutionalist features, such as more inclusive and transparent decision-
making and judicial review, should go together, and that in combination they
take on a special normative significance. If this is true, the constitutionalist recon-
struction does possess an additional explicative and prescriptive value. It reminds
us of the linkage between the various features of constitutionalism and calls for
complementing the existing constitutional features of international law (such as
judicial review of governmental acts) with missing ones, such as democracy and
judicial review of the acts of international organizations. To some extent, there is
indeed constitutionalist bootstrapping.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM
Another concern is culturalist. The constitutionalist reading of international
law may be genuinely anti-pluralist. It may have a uni-civilizational, notably Euro-
pean, bias built into it. "[T]he interests and distinctive cultural traditions of Third
20. See Daniel Bodansky, Is There an International Environmental Constitution?, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 565 (2009).
21. Id.
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World Countries... may be eroded by the evolution of such a system. ' '22 In response,
we might point to the numerous constitutionalist stories that are currently being
told within international legal scholarship: a single, uniform, consented-to constitu-
tionalist approach does not exist. While constitutionalist thought has, historically,
been developed in Europe, it is a reaction to the universal experience of domination
by humans of other humans. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, consti-
tutionalism was asserted against the dominant culture and the establishment. A
"moderate" constitutionalist reading in no way implies a uniform, coherent world
constitution, and certainly does not imply a world state. The idea is not to create a
global, centralized government, but to constitutionalize global, polyarchic, and mul-
tilevel governance. This project must indeed take more fully into account the needs
and interests of developing countries and their populations.
A related concern is that if Europeans "acquire disproportionate leverage on
the workings of a more highly 'constitutionalized' global system, the constitu-
tional model of international law is unlikely to command American allegiance,
especially if it is promoted as the paramount ethic of the global community."23
However, reliance on cultural specificity often risks over-simplification. Even
within the European international law academy, the constitutionalist approach is
frequently criticized, notably by French and British scholars. This criticism is not
automatically aligned with a pro-U.S. political attitude. The constitutionalist ap-
proach is directed against the disregard of the international rule of law. Even if, on
average, European academics probably espouse a more legalist position than their
U.S. counterparts, opposition between Europe and U.S. academic discourse ap-
pears simplistic; important impulses toward global constitutionalism have come
from U.S. scholars such as Richard Falk, Thomas Franck, Fernando R. Tes6n,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Joseph Nye.
IV. COMPENSATORY CONSTITUTIONALISM
The constitutionalist reconstruction of international law might be a reasonable
strategy to compensate for the deconstitutionalization on the domestic level, which is
22. Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 187, 189 (2006).
23. See Douglas M. Johnston, World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law, in To-
WARDS WORLD CONSTITUTIONALISM: IssuEs IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY,
supra note 9, at 3, 20.
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caused by globalization and global governance.24 Globalization puts the state and
state constitutions under strain. Global problems compel states to cooperate within
international organizations and through bilateral and multilateral treaties. What
were typically governmental functions, such as guaranteeing human security, free-
dom, and equality, are in part transferred to "higher" levels. Moreover, non-state ac-
tors, acting within states or even in a transboundary fashion, are increasingly entrusted
with the exercise of traditional state functions, even with core tasks such as military
and police activity.25 All this has led to "governance" which is exercised beyond the
states' constitutional confines. This means that state constitutions can no longer regu-
late the totality of governance in a comprehensive way. Thus, the original claim of
state constitutions to form a complete basic order is defeated. National constitutions
are, so to speak, hollowed out and traditional constitutional principles become dys-
functional or empty. This affects not only the constitutional principle of democracy,
but also the rule of law, the principle of social security, and the organization of terri-
tory.26 Therefore, if we wish to preserve the basic principles of constitutionalism, we
must ask for compensatory constitutionalization on the international plane.
V. GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A HERMENEUTIC DEVICE
The constitutionalist reading of international law contributes fresh argu-
ments to an old controversy which has recently emerged again, namely, the con-
troversy over whether international law is real "law." The new deniers of
international law justify the ostensibly non-legal character of international law by
turning to the lack of hard enforcement mechanisms and the democratic deficit
prevalent in international law. The constitutionalist approach helps to overcome
the narrow focus on sanctions and on top-down enforcement. In most countries,
domestic constitutional law is not enforceable. Typically, many constitutional pro-
visions are not justiciable in the sense of being directly applicable by courts. This
is especially the case in states that do not have a constitutional court, but is gener-
ally true for constitutional provisions with a programmatic, hortatory character.
24. See Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579 (2006).
25. In U.S.-occupied Iraq, employees of federal contractors and subcontractors worked as mer-
cenaries, police, guards, prison officers, and interrogators. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG.,
CONTRACTORS' SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, Publ'n No. 3053 (2008).
26. See Anne Peters, The Globalization of State Constitutions, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE Di-
VIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 251, 270-77, 285-93 (Janne Nijman & Andr6
Nollkaemper eds., 2007).
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Despite this feature, nobody denies the character of constitutional law as law for
this reason alone. This observation supports the view that international law, re-
sembling constitutional law in this respect, is indeed law.
Furthermore, the interpretation of particular norms and structures as consti-
tutional may provide an interpretative guideline. For instance, a constitutionalist
approach to reservations in human rights treaties leads to permitting such reser-
vations. To give another example, a constitutionalist-minded international lawyer
will determine the supremacy of international law over domestic constitutional
law in a non-formalist way.27 She will pay less attention to the formal sources of
law, and more to the substance of the rules in question. In a constitutionalist per-
spective, the ranking of the norms at stake must be assessed in a more subtle man-
ner, according to their substantive weight and significance. Such a non-formalist,
substance-oriented perspective suggests that provisions in state constitutions with
minor significance would have to give way to important international norms.28
Inversely, fundamental rights guarantees should prevail over less im-
portant norms (independent of their locus and type of codifica-
tion) ... Admittedly, this.., approach does not offer strict guidance
because it is debatable which norms are "important" in terms of sub-
stance, and because it does not resolve clashes between a "domestic"
human right on the one side and an "international" human right on
the other. However, the fundamental idea is that what counts is to look
at the substance, not at the formal category of conflicting norms.29
Such a flexible approach appears to better correspond better to the current
state of global legal integration than the idea of a strict hierarchy, particularly in
human rights matters.3"
27. See id. at 306-07; see also Andre Nollkaemper, Rethinking the Supremacy of International
Law, in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Riudiger Wol-
frum ed., forthcoming 2009).
28. Peters, supra note 24, at 306.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 307.
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VI. THE PROBLEM AND PROMISE OF POLITICS
Another objection is that global constitutionalism conveys a "false necessity
and false rigidity": it is too apolitical or pretends to be above politics.3' Moreover, a
"constitutionalist imperialism" performed by the participants in the legal and po-
litical process would stifle the ordinary legal process.32 As far as academic observ-
ers are concerned, the constitutionalist agenda might be a scholarly attempt to
channel or minimize politics. In short, constitutionalism can be criticized for em-
bodying an unrealistic "promise of the end of politics."33 This is what Jeffrey
Dunoff has aptly called "constitutional conceits."34 My response is that law and
politics should not be viewed as distinct realms, but rather as structurally coupled
systems.35 Law is both the product of political activity and an organizer of, and
limitation on, political action. In particular, constitutional law is a branch of law
which is very close to politics. Constitutional law and politics are mutually consti-
tutive. Consequently, constitutionalism is also a political, not simply an apolitical,
project (although it does suggest that there is a sphere "above" everyday politics).
Paradoxically, and in my mind laudably, the call for constitutionalism triggers
precisely the contestation and politics it is said to preempt. The evolutionary dy-
namics of constitutionalism lead both to the legalization of politics and to stron-
ger politicization of law.36 Even if any legalization of political problems (counting
constitutionalization as a special type of legalization) modifies the debate sur-
rounding those problems by introducing a different, juridical logic, the underly-
ing issues are thereby not totally, but only partly, depoliticized. Such a relative
depoliticization of international relations is not a disadvantage because interna-
tional relations are, as a general matter, rather too politicized. The introduction of
legal and even constitutional principles contributes to the stability of expectations,
legal certainty, and equal treatment of the relevant actors.
A related objection to the constitutionalist reconstruction of international law is
that this reading condones an impoverished, legalist (judicially made), apolitical
conception of constitutions. This objection is raised by those who place a premium
31. Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623, 623 (2006).
32. Szurek,supra note 13, at 48.
33. Klabbers, supra note 11, at 47.
34. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's "Constitution" and the Discipline of
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647, 672 (2006).
35. See NIKLAs LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 407-39 (1993).
36. Cf. MARTIN LOUCHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN LAW AND PoLITIcS 209 (2000).
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on popular sovereignty, democracy, and institutions directly accountable to the peo-
ple. Those critics ask for "democratic constitutionalism"37 or for a more "political
constitutionalism."'3 Political constitutionalism assumes that persons "reasonably
disagree ... about substantive outcomes.., that the democratic process itself is more
legitimate and effective than the judicial"39 one, and that therefore, the democratic
process, not rights, is the core of constitutionalization. In contrast, legalist constitu-
tionalism assumes that society can come to a rational consensus that is best expressed
in terms of basic rights that are best protected by courts. The problem with global
constitutionalism is, in the eyes of critics, that it is too legalist in that sense. In the
same vein, concern about a global juristocracy has been voiced. It is feared by some
that unrepresentative international judges will be called upon to adjudicate disputes
over the interpretation of constitutional text. This concern duplicates the traditional
British objection to a written, "rigid," constitution.
Admittedly, the constitutionalization of international law has been lopsided.
The process has so far been adjudicative rather than deliberative. This is most visible
in the WTO and the related microconstitutionalization debate. What has been iden-
tified by some scholars as constitutionalization of the WTO boils down to the legal-
ization of the dispute settlement mechanism, judge-made principles, and constitutional
techniques applied by the panels and the Appellate Body. The WTO's capacity for
legislative response is muted by the unanimity requirement. Such a structurally em-
bedded preponderance of judicial engineering is not limited to the WTO, but con-
cerns the macroconstitutionalization of the international legal system as a whole.
However, this critique, although it may be formulated as a critique of global
constitutionalism, is not in fact genuinely concerned with the constitutionalist read-
ing of international law. The criticism is, rather, that global governance suffers from
democratic deficits and-to some extent correspondingly-from overly powerful
courts. I submit that the danger of a global government of judges is exaggerated. Al-
though the constitutionalization of international law has been court-driven, and al-
though global constitutionalism even calls for further strengthening of judicial
review, the establishment of an international constitutional court with compulsory
jurisdiction over constitutional matters is unlikely. An "imperfect" international con-
stitution, backed by punctual judicial control, would constitute progress, not peril.4°
37. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 19-20.
38. See RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALIsM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007).
39. Id. at 4.
40. It could also be pointed out that, as long as international law enjoys only weak and indirect
democratic legitimacy, the counter-majoritarian difficulty of constitutional review is lesser on the
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Most importantly, global constitutionalism unveils precisely those deficits by intro-
ducing the constitutional vocabulary. The constitutional paradigm also inspires and
eventually facilitates the search for remedies. In my view, the remedy against an
overly "legalist" and overly "judicial" process of constitutionalization is not to stop
that process, but to democratize it.
A constitutionalist approach to international law helps to prevent uncon-
trolled "deformalization" of international law.4' Deformalization is the resort to
arguments of some "higher" legitimacy in opposition to and in violation of inter-
national legality, as in the Kosovo crisis.42 Although constitutionalism is a value-
loaded concept, it is nevertheless a legal approach in which consideration for the
rule of law in a formal sense, for legal stability and predictability, plays a part, and
which acknowledges that legality itself can engender a type of legitimacy.43 Seen
in this light, constitutionalism is a juridical alternative to moralizing on the one
hand, and to power politics on the other.
EN LIEU DE CONCLUSION:
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM's CRITICAL POTENTIAL
The core reproach of the new deniers of international law, legitimacy, and
particularly the democratic deficit, must be taken seriously. In this regard, global
constitutionalism is helpful, because it provokes the pressing question of the legiti-
macy of global governance. However, the intrinsic link between constitutionalism
and legitimacy cuts in many ways. Constitutionalism may legitimize the interna-
tional system, but it may also challenge its legitimacy. On the one hand, the dan-
ger is that "things formerly called institutional are being legitimized with the
mantle of constitutionalization. 4' This is unhelpful in analytic terms and dangerous
international plane than in the domestic legal order. However, two wrongs do not make a right. The
better course to take is to introduce more judicial review and more democratic decision-making.
41. Cf. J0RCEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 116 (Ciaran Cronin ed. & trans., 2006).
42. INDEP. INT'L COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
LESSONS LEARNED 185-98 (2000).
43. Cf. RUDOLF VON IHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER
ENTWICKLUtNG 471 (5th ed. 1880) ("Die Form ist die geschworene Feindin der Willkuir, die Zwillingss-
chwester der Freiheit. Denn die Form hilt der Verlockung der Freiheit zur Zugellosigkeit das Ge-
gengewicht, sie lenkt die Freiheitssubstanz in feste Bahnen, daB sie sich nicht zerstreue, verlaufe, sie
kr~iftigt sie nach innen, schiutzt sie nach auBen. Feste Formen sind die Schule der Zucht und Ordnung
und damit der Freiheit selber und eine Schutzwehr gegen auBere Angriffe - sie lassen sich nur
brechen, nicht biegen... ").
44. CAss, supra note 10, at 245 (discussing the debate on the constitutionalization of the WTO).
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from a normative perspective. On the other hand, ideas borrowed from global consti-
tutionalism are used by some scholars with the opposite intention, namely, to call into
question international law as a whole, and may constitute a pretext for noncompli-
ance.45 Again, the best path seems to be the middle one. Global constitutionalism
should not be used to bestow false legitimacy on international law, nor should the
complaint that international law lacks legitimacy undermine the authority of in-
ternational law as such. Rather, the constitutionalist reading should clarify that
the legitimacy of norms and of political rule does not depend on the structures of
government or governance being exactly state-like. Global constitutionalism
should and could help, rather than hinder, the revelation of existing legitimacy
deficiencies in this body of law without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Martti Koskenniemi sees the "virtue of constitutionalism in the international
world" in its "universalizing focus, allowing extreme [injustice] in the world to be
not only shown but also condemned." 6
[S]omething like a constitutional vocabulary is needed to articulate
it as a scandal insofar as it violates the equal dignity and autonomy
of human beings.... The use of the constitutional vocabu-
lary ... transforms individual suffering into an objective wrong
that concerns not just the victim, but everyone.... In a secular so-
ciety, it is the political business of constitutionalism to endow such
events with sacredness or with a symbolic meaning that lifts them
beyond their individuality.47
Indeed, there is, as Neil Walker put it, a "responsibilising potential in the con-
stitutional discourse and imagination in the development of a polity."' Those who
45. See Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403
(1996). Sellers argues "that purportedly international laws and institutions bind and should influ-
ence republican governments only to the extent that they reflect republican procedures of politics
and legislation." Id. at 404. "International institutions deserve political legitimacy and obedience
only to the extent that they conform to republican standards of popular sovereignty and pursuit of
the common good." Id. at 428. "Republics properly support the United Nations Secretariat only to
the extent that it maintains high standards.... the separate republican governments must them-
selves independently decide whether this is the case." Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
46. Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About Inter-
national Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 9,35 (2007).
47. Id. at 35-36.
48. See Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31,53 (Grginne de B6rca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001).
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
wish, for whatever motives, to make a plausible claim to constitutional elements in
international law must at least be seen to take these values seriously. Although con-
stitutionalism may be invoked as a way of closing the debate, in practice, it often has
the opposite effect, opening up a richer and more productive normative debate. The
reason is that "the tradition of constitutionalism remains the best-stocked normative
reservoir from which [responsible politics] may draw and the most persuasive me-
dium in which it may be articulated." 9 In effect, global constitutionalism deploys-
and this is what I deem crucial-a constructive, not obstructive, critical potential.
49. Id. at 57.
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